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A Clinical Experience
By Edwin H. Greenebaum*
Whenever individuals or groups needing help come to professionals
with specialized knowledge and skills, they must cope with issues com-
mon to all clinical situations. In a previous article in this journal,'
I have explained that whatever the unique features of different con-
texts, clinical work always involves problems: of communicating and
testing the reality of information and values; of working in and
representing groups; of trust in helping relationships; of conflicting
interests and viewpoints of clinic and client; of agreeing on the clinic's
tasks and implementing an organizational structure to accomplish them;
and of managing transactions (between clinic and client, between parts
of the clinical organization, and between the clinic and its environ-
ment) which are necessary for the clinic's work, but which always repre-
sent threats to clinics' and individuals' integrity.
Because the legal profession comprises diverse practices which vary
in significant ways, the one clinical experience shared by all of us in
the profession is traditional legal education as practiced in typical law
school courses, the clinic in which student-clients seek law faculty help
in becoming qualified as professional lawyers. My purpose in this arti-
cle is to make concrete and comment upon the common themes of
clinical work as they arise in this context which we have all experienced
intimately, occasionally painfully.
1. The Clinic
On the surface clinics and their clients agree on the tasks for which
they join together, for example in law school of qualifying laymen to
become lawyers. Nevertheless, clinics and clients have very different
viewpoints. For law schools education and research are the reasons
for their existence and are their continuing business. From law students'
viewpoint, in contrast, legal education is a temporary, preliminary
occupation: they bring with them prior learning and experience, incor-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
1. Greenebaum, The Professional Law School as a Focus for Clinical Educa-
tion, 8 J. LEGAL PROF. 101 (1983). Like the previous article, this one makes use of
material from a book manuscript in preparation, UNDERSTANDING CLINICAL EXPERIENCE
(Draft, 1984).
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porate a selection of the knowledge and experiences available to them
in law school, and go forward from law school to earn their livelihood
through the exchange of legal services for material rewards with the
institutions and individuals who are their clients and employers. Law
schools are matured, functioning organizations, while students, as
lawyers and otherwise, are in a starting-up, developmental phase. A
law school may focus on students as future lawyers, and when students
leave the school as successful graduates, the school is through with
them (except to ask them for money and political support). In con-
trast, students must integrate the lawyering aspects of themselves with
the rest of their lives. For them the process involves changes in
themselves, incorporating knowledge, values and behavioral skills. It
is unclear for them what aspects of their legal educations they will
be able to leave behind when they disentangle themselves from the law
school.
Clinicians tend to obscure their difficulties in agreeing on their
tasks. In law schools, tasks are uncertain in both content and priorities.
What is law and the practice of law are controversial descriptively and
normatively. Which aspects of professional training are a law school's
responsibility is controversial, as are the relative importance of teaching,
which is of primary concern to students, and research and service, which
law schools, like many clinics, understand to be part of their work.
Law schools have responded to these uncertainties by permitting faculty
to operate on their own task conceptions, subject only to indirect con-
trols of salary, promotion and tenure decisions and informal social
pressures. Significant diversity of task viewpoint is tolerated. Students
have diverse views on these matters as well, and faculty instruction
is only one source of influence on their task understanding.
Within any clinic there are typical contexts in which professionals
and clients engage each other. The courses which dominate law school
curricula are "all-purpose" organizations in which faculty understand
they have responsibilities for conveying knowledge of a subject matter,
training the skills necessary to "think like lawyers," and impart
appropriate professional models and attitudes according to which
students will behave responsibly in their professional roles. Faculty are
given wide latitude to order their priorities among these goals and to
fill them with their own conceptions of the law, the legal profession,
and the law school's task. The single examination at the end of a course
which typically measures students' performance furnishes imperfect and
(con)fused evidence of student competence in the different goal areas.
The single grade which the examination produces is averaged with the
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grades received in other all-purpose courses to determine eligibility for
graduation. There is no "quality control" of students' discrete com-
petencies in knowledge, skills and professionalism other than their having
sufficiently satisfied a sufficient number of faculty with their diverse,
and only informally controlled, task conceptions and priorities.
The clinical experience to which we turn will serve as a particular
example of a professional (a law school faculty member) helping clients
(law school students) achieve a desired goal (achieving qualification
for legal practice). The event described occurs in one of four or five
typical courses which law students will be taking during their first term
in law school. In recounting this clinical experience, I will illustrate
how one professional in one context coped with multiple, competing
task demands, in this instance of teaching about a specific legal sub-
ject matter and about the legal system of which it is a part, of training
in the skills of legal analysis and discourse, and of initiating the client-
students into the role of professional lawyer. This is an example of
an individual with professional training helping inexperienced clients
achieve goals sought by clients, but through a "treatment" program
prescribed by the profession on the basis of technical experience not
shared by client. I will follow the recounting of the clinical experience
with some commentary.
2. A Clinical Experience
This clinical experience is from the first-year course in Civil Pro-
cedure which I taught for several years. The teaching/learning situa-
tion to be described occurred during the fifth week both of the course
and the students' experience in law school, and my client-students were
still inexperienced in engaging with their faculty-clinicians. While the
classes in question reflected my idiosyncratic methods and task con-
ceptions, they were within the limits of conventional law school
pedagogy.
The subject matter of Civil Procedure, as I conceive it, is the means
provided by the legal system for resolving disputes and settling estates,
and the task of the course is to build a working model of this pro-
cedural system. One does not learn to exercise judgment in operating
in a system by learning the mechanics of isolated parts, be the system
inanimate machinery or a social system, but one must have a concep-
tion of the whole system and the functional relationship of the parts
to the whole. While operators can be instructed to take specifically
described actions in defined circumstances, for example, in operating
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machinery to turn a valve a specified degree and direction on a defined
indication, exercising judgment in their operations requires having a
working model of the system in their minds so they can estimate what
effects turning the valve will have in other parts of the machinery and
on the functioning of the whole.
Model building requires studying the parts and the whole at the
same time, which is a considerable intellectual challenge. At the same
time, misconceptions about law which beginning students' frequently
bring with them are drastically confronted in Civil Procedure, a sub-
ject matter many expect to involve learning clear rules regarding the
do's and don'ts of litigation, something like putting square pegs in
square holes. The reality is that critical aspects of the procedural system
are as uncertain and indeterminate as anything the law has to offer.
The shapes and sizes of the holes are constantly changing and the shapes
of the pegs subject to dispute. Overcoming these preconceptions was
perhaps the hardest obstacle to effective legal studies for many of my
client-students and the greatest obstacle in gaining their collaboration
with me in our shared clinical tasks.
In the class situation to be described, the class is studying the se-
cond case in the second chapter of the course materials, "Civil Litiga-
tion: Available Remedies." 2 Two subject matter tasks are pursued. The
part of the procedural system which is the subject of the chapter is
the kinds of remedies which may be available as the fruits of litiga-
tion. At the same time, this is the first occasion in my structuring of
the course on which examination of the functioning whole of litiga-
tion is undertaken.3
Regarding available remedies, the students became acquainted with
the award to claimants of monetary compensation, with decrees and
injunctions, and with declaratory judgments. The object was not to
2. The teaching materials were ones accumulated and edited by me over my
several years teaching the course rather than a commercially published casebook. Edwin
H. Greenebaum, Materials on the Resolution of Dispute (not published).
3. The first chapter in the course materials had acquainted the students with
some estate settling and dispute resolving devices which, like the "judgments" which
conclude litigation, foreclose subsequent litigation of the merits of a dispute, for
example, statutes of limitations which provide that claims may not be sued upon in
litigation after periods of time and settlements which provide for conclusive deter-
mination of parties' rights by agreement. The procedural system offers complentary
devices for settling disputes which is the systemic context in which each operates. Also,
litigation, the most complex device, contains elements of the simpler devices studied
in the first chapter, that is, time limits, stipulations, and protection of reliance on
representations.
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achieve comprehensive learning of the topic, which was treated in only
nine class sessions, but to sample the kinds of remedies available and
become acquainted with the factors which influence development of
the law governing remedies and its administration in cases. That is,
the purpose was to identify one part of the procedural system with
sufficient understanding for it to take a functioning position in the
whole.
In examining the whole of litigation, students' attention was directed
to the fact that litigation is coercive; those served with a court sum-
mons to respond to an asserted claim must participate in the litigation
or lose their rights by default. Students were directed to examine what
the justifications may be for this coercive process, including the necessity
of having disputes resolved, the importance to the parties and to the
public of protecting and vindicating substantive rights, the existence
of ascertainable and acceptable legal criteria (rules of law) to control
results, the existence of procedures likely to reach correct results, deci-
sion making by competent and impartial judges and juries, and par-
ticipation of the parties in the decision making process. In their studies
students discover that each of these foundations for the acceptability
of litigation can be very shaky.
The case which is the focus of our teaching/learning situation raises
a question of whether a claimant should be compensated with money
for a psychic/emotional injury which claimant asserts she has suffered
and will continue to suffer in the future as a result of defendant's
misconduct. More particularly, the case in question, McAlister v. Carl,"
raises the issue of in what circumstances and to what extent claimants
may be awarded compensation for that loss of enjoyment of life which
may result when injuries (negligently caused by defendants) disable
claimants from pursuing their chosen occupations. Economic injuries
are not necessarily involved in such cases as alternative employments
available to claimants may pay as well, even if they do not give as
much satisfaction. In advance of class, students are assigned to study
the appellate court's opinion and some notes which include a problem
in which students are asked to prepare a memorandum (in their minds)
in the role of a clerk to a trial court judge in the jurisdiction in which
McAlister v. Carl was decided, evaluating how McAlister v. Carl should
bear on the decision of a hypothetical new case involving a claim with
some similarities to that precedent. It is my clinical task to help students
understand and use these materials to attain course goals. If the substan-
4. 223 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964).
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tial description of and quotation from the case and notes which follow
seem tedious, bear in mind that it is less than the students endure in
preparing for these (usually two) classes.
In McAlister v. Carl, there was no question that defendant was
legally responsible for claimant's injuries, that is, that defendant's
negligence caused the injuries, nor, as the case was presented in the
appellate court, was there any continuing question regarding claimant's
compensation for economic injuries (principally medical expenses). The
trial judge, however, had not allowed claimant to introduce evidence
which would have shown that claimant had recently received a college
degree in physical education and that the injuries suffered would pre-
vent her from pursuing her chosen occupation as a physical education
instructor.
Colloquies between court and counsel made it clear that this
evidence was intended as the first step in showing that the plaintiff
was trained in this field, that she wished and intended to become
a teacher of physical education-particularly of swimming-and
that her injuries prevented her from doing so and required her to
take up another and more sedentary occupation.'
This aspect of loss of enjoyment of life, therefore, was not available
for consideration by the jury in awarding compensation, although the
jury was in a position, and was instructed by the judge, in awarding
compensation for "pain and suffering" to consider evidence of
claimant's diminished ability to engage in and enjoy swimming,
horseback riding and long motor trips. "The jury's verdict was for
$1,528.50, which was substantially the sum of plaintiff's medical
expenses . . . plus $1,000.00.116 Claimant asserted on appeal that the
trial judge's refusal to permit presentation of the evidence regarding
her ability to pursue her chosen occupation was an error requiring
reversal of the judgment.
The appellate court's opinion acknowledges that certain aspects
of emotional distress are compensable by awards of money, but notices
that:
Authorities are divided, however, as to whether loss of enjoyment
of life is compensable in damages .... Several objections are relied
upon to defeat recovery for such damages: usually that such
damages are too speculative or uncertain and are incapable of
5. Id. at , 197 A.2d at 141.
6. Id. at , 197 A.2d at 142.
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measurement in monetary terms, and sometimes that such damages
would overlap other elements of damage otherwise compensated
for, and occasionally because of lack of causal connection. Cases
which uphold recovery have no difficulty with the question of causa-
tion (and we have indicated that here we do not), and they usually
meet the other objections on the ground that the problems of deter-
mining the existence of such damages and of measuring them in
money are not materially different from those involved in making
any award for pain and suffering. .... I
After describing some of the precedents, the court goes on to say:
Most of the cases which have upheld recovery for loss of enjoy-
ment have done so on a broader basis than is involved here. Usually
they deal with capacity to enjoy things which involve matters of
common experience with which a jury may be expected to have
some familiarity .... Though we agree with courts and commen-
tators who have adopted the view that the difficulty of measuring
damages for loss of enjoyment in terms of money should not of
itself be a bar to the recovery of damages for such loss, we are
not unmindful of the numerous cases in which this court had held
that speculative damages are not recoverable. It is difficult to lay
down any hard and fast rule and to draw a clear and sharp line
of demarcation between damages which are purely speculative and
damages which are capable of some reasonable measurement based
upon the common knowledge or experience of juries (or of judges
sitting without juries). In cases involving loss of capacity to enjoy
more or less usual or familiar things or activities of life, the ele-
ment of speculation seems no greater than in disfigurement cases.
. . . But once we get beyond that and have to consider such a
question as we have here-damages for the enforced abandonment
of a desired occupation which the plaintiff had not entered upon-
the problem is apt to become more difficult and the guides of
common experience less sure. In some instances, however, this
might not present any great added difficulty. Thus, we might
suppose a case in which the plaintiff has completed a college course
designed as a preliminary to entering medical school, has just
graduated from medical school, has taken and passed the necessary
examinations and has received a license to practice, has prepared
himself and plans to engage in surgery, and has been appointed
to an internship in some great hospital. Then through the defen-
dant's negligence, he suffers injuries to his hands which prevent
him from practicing surgery. In such a case, and leaving to one
7. Id. at __, 197 A.2d at 143-4.
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side any question of pecuniary loss which might be entailed, the
loss of the plaintiff's opportunity to engage in his chosen occupa-
tion would seem to be one for which damages could be awarded
without any substantially greater risk of speculation than would
be involved in making an award for disfigurement (apart from loss
of earning power consequent thereon), and would seem to be
equally compensable.8
Nevertheless, the court affirms the trial court's judgment.
We think that whether, or to what extent, damages claimed for
loss of enjoyment due to enforced change of occupation are too
speculative to be submitted to the jury, depends in large measure
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, and that
the admissibility of evidence with regard thereto should (at least
until sufficient experience shall have developed to warrant the for-
mulation of a more definite rule) be committed largely to the discre-
tion of the trial court.9
There is ambiguity, however, regarding the object of the discretion
in a case where the right to jury trial has been claimed. Is the trial
judge permitted to decide whether a particular item is a matter of
''common experience" the loss of which may be compensable or is
not too "speculative" on some other basis? Or is the discretion limited
to a decision whether the offered evidence is sufficiently probative to
be worth the jury's attention, or whether it would only serve to con-
fuse or obscure the evidence which the jury ought to consider? This
ambiguity arises because the court goes on to say:
Our examination of the testimony admitted and of the lengthy
colloquies as to what the plaintiff was seeking to show leads us
to think that the evidence as to whatever sense of disappointment
or frustration or of loss of enjoyment the plaintiff may have
experienced through her inability to become a physical education
instructor was rather vague and unsubstantial. Though it is evident
that she was fond of swimming and that she had elected to make
physical education the major field of her collegiate education, it
seems clear that she had done little to carry her ambition into prac-
tical effect. She had graduated from college, we suppose, in June
and had had summer jobs as a lifeguard and swimming instructor.
It was not until the September following her graduation that she
was advised by her doctor not to go into teaching physical educa-
8. Id. at __, 197 A.2d at 145.
9. Id. at __, 197 A.2d at 146.
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tion, but to go into a more sedentary occupation; yet even then,
with the opening of the school year close at hand, she had not
obtained employment as an instructor in physical education. She
spoke merely of then being "interested" in such a job in some
unspecified school in Virginia. We find no indication that such
employment had been offered her, and certainly she had not
engaged in it. Furthermore, there is no proffer of any direct
evidence to show that her enjoyment of life in the work which she
has since gone into is less than it would have been in physical educa-
tion. On this state of the record, we think that any damages which
might have been attributable to the plaintiff's inability to become
an instructor in physical education were in the realm of specula-
tion. . . . We accordingly affirm the judgment appealed from."
Class discussion of the case, molded by my "leadership" into my
version of the Socratic law school classroom, included my questioning
students regarding their understanding of the court opinion, further
questions intended to draw out and develop their analysis, my com-
ments on their responses and on the materials, and discussion among
students. Through this process we sought to elucidate the position in
which the court in McAlister found itself and the factors influencing
its decision. As the court notes, its decision is not directly controlled
by authority. The court, therefore, must declare the law for the case
consistently with such precedents as there are and with legally signifi-
cant values.
The court is faced with a dilemma; there will be regrettable costs
in deciding the case either way. Some of the factors are recounted in
the following paragraphs.
There are several respects in which allowing compensation for the
asserted claim would seem unsatisfactory. Evidence of loss of enjoy-
ment will usually center on the claimants' testimony which may be of
questionable reliability because of their interest in the result. Awarding
money for a psychic injury requires an entirely subjective evaluation.
How are experiences of pain and loss of enjoyable activities such as
horseback riding and swimming equated with $1,000? If a jury should
be persuaded to award an extremely large amount, judges reviewing
10. Id. (citation omitted). An additional conceivable construction of the court's
holding was that the trial court's ruling was "harmless error." That is, even if the
exclusion of the evidence was error, it did not affect McAlister's rights sufficiently
to justify a new trial. As the opinion did not purport to rely on harmless error, and
as the discourse was already sufficiently complicated, I chose not to introduce the
principle at this point unless students raised it. They never did.
The Journal of the Legal Profession
the award, for example, on a motion for a new trial, would find it
difficult to articulate criteria by which to reject that verdict. These
factors indicate a strong potential for unequal treatment of claimants
and defendants in similar circumstances, but having their cases heard
by different tribunals. And there are court precedents supporting the
limitation of compensation in this area.
Opposing factors, however, tend to make awards for these injuries
feel compelled. The loss may be a real, felt injury for which a sense
of justice may require compensation, and letting defendants off too
lightly might fail to deter careless conduct. The limitations on the
available evidence to support such claims are not necessarily the fault
of claimants. There is difficulty in finding a reasoned distinction between
this and other psychic injuries for which compensation is allowed. That
is, the limitation seems arbitrary which allows claimant to go as far
as to show loss of enjoyment of activities, such as horseback riding
and swimming, but not to show their relevance to career training. (One
wonders, in fact, if McAlister's lawyer made the argument that the
evidence of career training and intentions should have been admitted
to prove the extent to which she received pleasure from horseback riding
and swimming.) Finally, there is concern for possible infringement of
the claimed right to jury trial if the trial judge is to make necessarily
factual distinctions, such as whether a loss is one which would be com-
parable to common experience or whether the evidence is sufficiently
persuasive to make it worth considering.
Study and discussion of these matters was intended to contribute
to students' understanding of remedies, but also to further develop
jurisprudential themes worked on from the beginning of the course:
that courts face dilemmas in which there are no satisfactory decisions,
that factors focusing on an issue may relate both to values of substan-
tive law and to the operation of the procedural system (whether to
permit an "irrational" determination equating pain with money affects
the acceptability of courts' decisions as well as compensation for
injuries), and that indeterminacy in the law exists not only where
authorities are not controlling, but also because courts and legislatures
sometimes choose to adopt indeterminate rules.
The "Problem" in the notes following the court's opinion in the
teaching materials was intended to exercise students in their developing
abilities to understand the course subject matter and to analyze and
argue the resolution of legal issues. But, as will be seen, issues of pro-
fessional roles and responsibilities were introduced as well.
4. Problem: You are a clerk to a trial judge in the same jurisdic-
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tion as the one which decided McAlister v. Carl. In a subsequent
case, a female plaintiff has offered to prove the following matters:
She has graduated from an accredited law school and passed the
state's bar exam, although plaintiff has not obtained or attempted
to obtain a position or office to practice law. She has subsequently
been injured due to the negligence of defendant resulting in plain-
tiff's becoming blind. Plaintiff's primary interests in life are
marriage and family, but she had intended to pursue a legal occupa-
tion in charitable and public service capacities, and she had felt
a sense of security knowing that she could practice law for pay
if the necessity should ever arise. And finally, blindness makes the
practice of law exceedingly more constricted, and perhaps
impossible if the attorney does not have special talents and
experience.
Your judge has asked you for a memorandum on how McAlister
v. Carl bears on the issue of damages in the subsequent case. The
judge would also like you to advise him whether the damages should
be any different if he should find that plaintiff's injuries were
intentionally, rather than negligently caused?
5. The extent to which McAlister would control the above
"problem" case as a precedent will be discussed in class. To the
extent that you do not develop the available distinctions on your
own, you may find it worthwhile to try to identify those factors
inhibiting your work.
6. Do you feel McAlister's attorney represented her competently
in developing arguments and in being adequately resourceful in
finding and using precedent? If not, what factors may have
inhibited the quality of that attorney's service?
Suppose as a practicing attorney you feel hostility towards women
who offer their valuable professional services for nothing, because
it's the kind of work you would like to do but feel you should
be paid for it. (In fact you are just establishing your practice and
are a bit hungry.) If the claimant in the problem case above sought
your professional representation, what service would you provide?
7. Conflicts of interest can be very subtle. (The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility discusses the topic in Canon 5.) The respon-
sible practice of law is a challenge to anyone's maturity, but
collaborating professionals can be helpful to each other in
responding appropriately to the personally challenging aspects of
practice. In that regard, you are presently developing habits of
thought and behavior which will influence your professional life.
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How do you presently share the responsibility for learning in law
school courses? How and to what extent do you give each other
constructive help and support?
Class discussion of the "Problem" typically generated diverse views
regarding whether the damages in the situation are too speculative,
whether the loss qualifies as a matter of common or familiar experience,
whether the offered evidence is more probative than in McAlister v.
Carl. These factors were usually compared to the court's hypothetical
regarding the medical student, for example, noting that law, like
medicine, requires obtaining a graduate degree, rather than only
enduring an undergraduate program, as in McAlister v. Carl, and that
this evidences a greater commitment to the occupation.
Thus, in their fifth week as lawyers, students were learning to play
the legal game, but they were not too venturesome. For example, class
members never noticed without prompting a distinction between
McAlister v. Carl and the problem facts, that is, that claimant in the
problem was offering to prove a loss of security as well as a loss of
enjoyment. This difference may be argued not to require a different
result, but it is a kind of difference which students were learning to
be the subject of legal argument (for example, is a loss of security
more important, more a matter of common experience, more
persuasive?).
Class members were slow, as well, to examine decision making
processes in McAlister and in the "Problem" as human, social
phenomena. They seldom raised for discussion on their own initiative,
for example, questions regarding whether the court in McAlister v.
Carl was influenced by biases favoring high status, predominantly male
professions (medicine) and against a lower status, more predominantly
female one (school teachers) and how the possibility of this bias affects
predictions regarding court responses to such cases in the present and
future. Even after the issue was raised, there was infrequently explicit
indication that questions raised by the case and problem were of per-
sonal importance to class members, even though there was significant
female representation in the class membership during a period in which
feminism was developing vigorously. It was left to my initiative, as
well, to introduce into the discussion the possibility that biased
stereotypes and attitudes may have affected the quality of representa-
tion of McAlister by her lawyer and the service which the students
themselves may provide their future clients, although students professed
to be concerned with practical and ethical problems (and although the
notes had called these aspects of the "Problem" to their attention).
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There is a significant difference in studying mechanical and social
systems. With mechanical devices, there is no ambiguity regarding
motive power; its source, the quantity of its force and the pathways
of its transmission can all be identified. Some experiments with animate
systems simulate this situation. A hungry rat learning to run a maze
in search of food (and without the distraction of other rats, especially
those of the opposite sex) presents little ambiguity in motivation.
Creatures with more subtle motivations, however, are less suitable
objects for such behavioral studies. Building a model of the procedural
system, as we attempt to do in Civil Procedure, presents all the
difficulties inherent in understanding human, purposive activities;
motivations are multiple and conflicting and must be inferred from
participants' actions as well as from what they say. This view of the
subject matter which I was dedicated to helping my client-students see
and accept was strongly resisted. I confess to colleagues and students
that Civil Procedure was for me a year long struggle for the hearts
and minds of my students. Motivations have emotional implications,
and studies of human systems are complicated by the complex motiva-
tions of those, students and teachers, conducting the investigations.
In the clinical work I have recounted, I believe that I had a coherent
conception of the goals I was pursuing and that they were appropriate
to the teaching/learning work of the larger law school program. I had
first encountered McAlister v. Carl in the teaching materials of another
experienced Civil Procedure teacher,"I and colleagues who have helped
me with drafts of this article 2 have told me they are interested in using
the case and the "Problem" in their own teaching. Finally, the teaching
methods I used consisted of rational discussion among adults and were
validated by a long, pervasive tradition in legal education. It seems
it should have worked, but my judgment is that the success of this
work was limited. The reasons, I believe, relate to difficulties in clinical
work generally, as I will explain in the commentary which follows.
3. Commentary
If inexperienced clients are not to be passive objects of their pro-
11. Dean Paul D. Carrington, then on the faculty of University of Michigan
Law School, whose civil procedure casebook I used for a year in a pre-publication
version.
12. I am grateful to Professors Bruce M. Diamond, Jay M. Feinman, Marc
Feldman, Michael J. Goldberg, Allan R. Stein, and Tommy F. Thompson of Rutgers
School of Law, Camden, for their comments.
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fessional helpers' practices, they need to learn to recognize, digest and
use new information. Early in students' legal studies, as they were in
this teaching/learning situation, the subject matter of law courses,
including Civil Procedure, are not merely new data; it is a new kind
of information organized on a structure of legal doctrine. The nature
of "rules of law" is not simply explained in familiar terms. These are
conceptions which influence decisions of lawyers in their various roles,
but which are indeterminate, having shifting meanings in different con-
texts. Legal rules are understood differently by different lawyers, which
is itself a part of the reality of these "rules." Further adding to
difficulty, the subject matter must be inferred from an unfamiliar
literature which has to be understood as a product of the processes
which produced it. For example, the meaning of language in a court
opinion is different depending on whether the judges are speaking in
a context of permitting an action to be commenced, determining the
proper instructions to a jury, foreclosing decision of a case by a jury
by directing a verdict, awarding a new trial or, as in McAlister v. Carl,
admitting or excluding evidence. In each instance what facts are assumed
to be true and what turns on the result will differ. Students, however,
come for help with becoming lawyers, not to be burdened with such
uncertainties.
Clients do not easily conceive, then, the goals of professional work
from clinicians' viewpoint. In the law school classroom, there are
multiple goals, and the studied materials have multiple relevance. The
McAlister case, for example, is examined for its practical use in
lawyering roles, for its contribution to course themes, for directions
in law reform, for increasing jurisprudential sophistication and reading
skills in the legal literature, and for exploring professional responsibilities
and conflicts of interests. As students and faculty develop their trains
of thought in class discussion, the focus of examination may shift
without explicit indication. Our student-clients need to develop apt con-
ceptions of each goal and must perceive the aspect which is presently
being discussed. Unfortunately, the focus of class discussion is already
shifting among goals before students have developed that competency.
Further, students need to conceive how work in the present class
relates to their larger law school experience and career development.
How can the class discussion help students to do better in the course
examination? What messages in this course are valid for other subject
matters and other instructors? How do students' developing concep-
tions and behavior affect their professional and personal group member-
ships? What are the values implicit in the information which I am
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pushing at students in the teaching/learning situation? From what value
perspective do I elucidate and emphasize? Is my implicit career advice
regarding acceptable styles of legal discourse and behavior good advice?
Differences in clinic and client groups' composition and in their
relations to external constituencies inhibit the trust with which clients
accept what their professional helpers tell them. A clinic's clients may
be very heterogenous. For example, the diversity of the legal profes-
sion, with its multiple, conflicting images, attracts a diverse student
body to law school.' 3 While some students will have been planning
to be lawyers from early years, others make late decisions to attend
law school as the least unattractive alternative presently available to
them. The clinicians who clients encounter are likely to be much less
diverse. Law faculty, for example, are selected on close examination
by this already homogeneous group from the most successful of former
law students. They are actually attracted to the institution and the way
it works. Clinicians easily develop loyalties to their professional group,
and this cohesiveness is felt by clients.
Important constituencies outside of the helping relationship affect
professionals and clients as they work together. In law school courses,
those constituencies include state authorities, the universities of which
law schools are a part, the practicing bar, the national legal education
community, and the law school's administration and faculty. These
groups affect law school funding, faculty promotion, tenure and
mobility, and students' abilities to pass bar examinations and obtain
job placements. The faculty's and students' mental images of these
constituencies reflect both reality and fantasy. This is a complex field
in which participants' views of what needs to be done for clinical work
interact with their ideas of what they must look like to satisfy those
who will make decisions which will affect their lives.
Experienced professionals can easily forget how confusing the rules
of the clinical game can be to their clients, whose opportunities to test
the reality of their developing conceptions may be chaotic and difficult
to organize. Law students do not usually receive direct feedback on
their current understanding, but are limited to vicarious participation
13. According to D. CAMPBELL, MANUAL FOR THE STRONG-CAMPBELL INTEREST
INVENTORY 60 (1974), most occupational groups have distinct psychological profiles,
but a "few occupations, notably, LAWYER and INVESTMENT FUND MANAGER,
resisted classification, in the sense that they had no high mean scores, which probably
means that these occupations are not psychologically homogeneous and should be
broken up into smaller groups." See also J. HOLLAND, MAKING VOCATIONAL CHOICES:
A THEORY OF CAREERS (1973).
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in conversations between faculty and other students. Opportunities for
their direct participation in class are unpredictable and stressful. Com-
paring understanding with other students is unreliable. The most power-
ful reinforcement may come when students feel they have developed
an understanding which has helped them to get from one day's work
to the next. Students develop strong attachments to such understanding
whether or not the understanding is apt.
Professionals have their information processing problems as well.
I brought with me to the teaching/learning situation my understanding
of the subject matter and of students' problems of learning it, as well
as a strategy for achieving my teaching goals. These preconceptions
needed to be tested against the reality of the situation, but understanding
students' verbal and nonverbal communications was not easy as I
attempted at the same time to explain (and defend) my conceptions
of the subject matter, to assess the responses of individual students
and of the whole class, and to meet my faculty colleagues' expecta-
tions of my work. Ideally, I should have empathetically listened to
students' conceptions and worked to understand their problems of
understanding, but I had problems of my own.
Processing information and accomplishing the clinic's tasks are
complicated by our difficulties in working in and on behalf of groups.
That clients frequently are groups and are always members of groups
affects the functioning of professional and client working together.
Groups develop rules, for example regarding the appropriateness of
student initiative in class discussion, which are uncomfortable to break.
Emotions such as dependent helplessness, paranoid anger, and euphoric
hopefulness seem contagious in group life. The group culture related
to these emotional states in law school classes admires ease of intellec-
tual brilliance. Groping through uncertainty is not rewarded in student
or teacher, although functionally that is what is required. Lawyers'
and judges' behavior in legal processes is genuinely confusing in many
instances, and expertise is not adequate to remove this reality, as dis-
appointing as this may be. Clinicians will choose either to collude with
the myth of expertise's omniscience or to labor with their clients to
confront reality. In the large class situation, students' lack of control
resulting from their immature understanding is aggravated by the
difficulties of group life. In the group, students' competence sometimes
seems to have flown away. For some students the experience of being
called upon in class feels devastating.
Professionals' expertise does, of course, give them advantage over
their clients. I came to the teaching/learning situation with an organized
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knowledge of the subject matter and with experience in the clinical
context with the directions in which the work was likely to lead. For
the inexperienced students, who were my clients, all was uncertainty.
Their dependency in needing help from me may have provoked in
students unresolved issues of relations to parents and other authority
figures in their life histories, leading them to act in the present context
on old scripts which may not have been appropriate. I, for my part,
had emotional needs for a responsive class, was responding in the law
school to the authorities who judged my work, and had to cope with
the frustrations of the inevitability of the class being a partial failure
(as well as a partial success).
Supplementing the protections of expertise, professionals, their
colleagues and their predecessors structure clinical contexts to protect
themselves from the anxieties inherent in their work. 4 Inexperienced
students with uncertain relations among themselves come in large groups
into the law school classroom where they sit in uniform rows and where
the instructor has the power of the podium and of giving grades. Because
the benefits of such positions are conferred on individual professionals
by traditions they do not create and have limited power individually
to alter, they can feel diminished responsibility for the situation. And
clients, including our students, can easily assume roles of victims with
no responsibility at all.
There are important aspects of clinical work of which clients have
special knowledge, that is, the circumstances of their own situations.
As clients become experienced, they can become expert in their own
cases, making possible fruitful collaboration between professional and
client.' 5 As my students became expert in their particular learning
problems, they were in a position to help me to help them, and I needed
that help to be most effective. In typical law school classes, however,
that spirit of collaboration comes in fine, but too rare moments.
Underlying the difficulties of working together is that negotiating
a task between clinic and client frequently amounts to an adhesion
contract. In our "Clinical Experience" the students are assumed to
have accepted what the law school was offering in accepting admis-
sion. But implicitly the negotiation continued. Students accepted what
they were able to and what they would; they wrote examination papers
for me; and I could have failed them all if I dared. I didn't dare;
14. See I. E. P. MENZIES, A CASE STUDY IN THE FUNCTIONING OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
AS A DEFENSE AGAINST ANXIETY (1967).
15. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974).
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but they didn't dare reject everything I offered, either. I was concerned
to change students into the best possible lawyers for the benefit of
their future clients, while students' most pressing need was to get through
the course on acceptable terms. I felt I was benefitting students in my
attempts to re-create them in my own successful, rewarded image, but
to students my image may have seemed neither possible nor desirable.
While I was aware that these conflicting interests and task issues were
very difficult to deal with in this large class with its goal of building
a model of the procedural system, I also knew that there was nowhere
else in the first-year curriculum where working through task conflicts
was central.
Different law school faculty make different compromises with the
constraints of this systemically difficult situation, and over all, in our
hopefully complementary ways, we may do as good a job as the struc-
ture of all-purpose courses permit. In the scope of this article, I have
been able to do little more than call attention, with regrettably little
development, to problems which pervasively confront clinicians and
their clients and illustrate how they arise in legal education, the clinic
in which law faculty and their client-students work together. Law schools
as clinics have their unique tasks, complexities and constraints, but
any clinic may obscure important issues through its organization. It
seems responsible, then, to ask of a law school, or of any other clinic,
whether there might be more productive ways to organize ourselves
for our particular helping tasks.
